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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
SHANE NEBEKER,

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

Appellant,
Appellate Case no. 20170438
vs.
District Court Case No. 154600140
TRJSHA ANN ORTON,

Appellee.

1. INTRODUCTION

In this case, the Trial Court made factual determinations contrary to the clear weight of
the evidence and controlling law. These findings resulted in the ultimate custody and
parent-time award, and without the findings, there is no reasonable basis for the Trial
Court's decision. The Trial Court further abused its discretion by not awarding parenttime more than the minimum guidelines despite findings that warrant this.
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Mr. Nebeker addresses facts and argument raised by Ms. Orton in her brief under Utah
R. of App. Pro. Rule 24(b). Ms. Orton has misstated key aspects of the trial testimony and
overlooked the law concerning insufficiency of the evidence and abuse of discretion. Each
issue is discussed below.

a. Factual Disputes
Ms. ·Orton never lived with her parents in Elsinore, Utah. Appellee' s Brief at p. 9. She
instead lived with them in Iron County from January 2014, shortly after Graeson's birth,
until she went on the run after the Fifth District Court of Iron County issued a warrant for
her arrest. ROA 175 at 28:3-9. It is similarly misleading to imply that Mr. Nebeker chose
not to see Graeson for a year and a half. Appellee's Brief at p. 9-10. Mr. Nebeker did
attempt to visit Graeson at Ms. Orton's parent's home at least one time after a hearing on
the Office of Recovery Service's paternity petition in Cedar City. ROA 257 at 61:19 to
62:3. However, Ms. Orton's daughter did not know where she was or when she would be
back. Id. This corresponded to a period where Ms. Orton was distributing illegal drugs
and included a period from January or February 2015 until August 2015 when she was
running from law enforcement. ROA 175 at 26:7 to 26:25. It also corresponded to a period
where Ms. Orton put strict conditions on Mr. Nebeker seeing Graeson, including coming
by himself and remaining at her home and was unreliable in communicating with Mr.
Nebeker. ROA 257 at 61:2-13. Mr. Nebeker indeed noted these conditions would have
been uncomfortable, but in the context of Ms. Orton not always communicating with him
and his belief she maintained 'feelings' for him which he did not reciprocate in part because
of his reconciliation with his wife. ROA 257 at 60:23 to 61: 13.
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Mr. Nebeker similarly did not sit back and do nothing to assert his rights until he filed
the underlying case. Appellee's Brief at p. I 0. He worked with at least three attorneys to

try to secure his parental rights. ROA 257 at 61 :10-13, 62:2 to 63:13. He requested contact
on a weekly basis using the only means Ms. Orton gave him to contact her. Id. at 60:23 to
61 :2. It was not for lack of trying that Mr. Nebeker did not initiate the underlying case
until October 2015. Id. at 62:2-3. He participated in hearings to establish paternity and
child support in Iron County. See State of Utah, Office ofRecovery Services v. Nebeker et

al., Fifth District Court oflron County, case no. 144500196 1• This was a stipulated matter
at trial. ROA 175 at 5:23-25. Mr. Nebeker has paid his support obligation under the Fifth
District Case, though there is an arrearage because of the time it took to establish paternity.
ROA 175 at 54:3-6, Judgment of Paternity, dated June 17, 2015, attached as Exhibit A.
b. Legal Disputes

Mr. Nebeker has challenged the sufficiency of the Trial Court's factual findings
regarding the parties' relative parental fitness, the parties' relative past conduct and moral
standards, Mr. Nebeker's tacit approval of any custody situation where he is not the child's
primary caretaker, the manner Mr. Nebeker obtained custody of Graeson, and its
assessment of the primary caretaker pending disposition contrary to Ms. Orton's arguments
otherwise. This Court should have a definite and firm conviction the Trial Court made a
mistake in weighing the evidence in making its determinations based on the available
evidence and underlying law. These errors undermine the Trial Court's ultimate custody

1
The hearing that established Mr. Nebeker as Graeson's father occurred on May 4, 2015 though the
written findings and decree did not enter until June 17, 2015. See Docket attached as Exhibit B. Thus, at
the time he took Graeson, Mr. Nebeker had been adjudicated as his father.
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and parent-time determinations by removing a reasonable basis for the decision. These
points are addressed in turn.
1.

The Trial Court's Findings Identified by Ms. Orton Are Unsupported by the
Evidence.
Mr. Nebeker acknowledges the burden to demonstrate a finding is erroneous is heavy.

In re. R.B., 2014 UT App. 270,124, 339 P.3d 137. In this case, Mr. Nebeker has met his
burden by identifying the evidence presented to the Trial Court and legal flaws in the
application of this evidence. See State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987) (a finding
is "clearly erroneous only if the finding is without adequate evidentiary support or induced
by an erroneous view of the law"). Because a trial court has the prerogative of weighing
the evidence and assessing credibility, as noted by Ms. Orton, this burden is complicated
in fact-intensive matters such as child custody determinations. See Roberts v. Roberts, 835
P.2d 193, 196 (UT App. 1992) (child custody factors "are highly personal and individual,
and do not lend themselves to the means of generalization employed in other areas of the
law") (internal citations and quotations omitted). Looking outside the trial court's written
findings requires a certain amount of speculation particularly in a case like this where the
Trial Court did not expressly identify the weight it gave to evidence and the credibility it
assigned to witnesses, though it did make at least one credibility determination. ROA at
68 (''the evidence at trial was disputed"). This highlights the requirement that a trial court's
"decision must be set forth fully in appropriate findings and conclusions," Painter v.

Painter, 752 P.2d 907, 909 (Utah App. 1988), and a reason why marshaling should not
serve as a stand-alone basis for denying a claim. Tobler v. Tobler, 2014 UT App. 239, 1
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14, 337 P.3d 296. In similar contexts, where the record does not support a trial court's
decision, this Court found findings insufficient. See Allen v. Allen, 2014 UT App. 27, ,
26, 319 P.3d 770 (memorandum decision) (finding the failure to analyze the Jones factors
together with a record that did not clearly support the trial court's decision made the
findings insufficient).

In this context, Mr. Nebeker has adequately challenged the

sufficiency of the Trial Court's findings, and the Court should find them erroneous.
It is against the clear weight of the evidence to use the time from Graeson' s birth until
Mr. Nebeker's support obligation was established or his conduct before birth in assessing
his fitness as suggested by Ms. Orton. Appellee's Brief at p. 15. This Court should have
a definite and firm conviction the Trial Court made a mistake in this respect. Mr. Nebeker
has set out the appropriate standard for assessing fitness - a parent's ability to care for a
child with a particular focus on physical custody, and Ms. Orton has failed to identify any
contrary controlling precedent. Shioji v. Shioji, 712 P.2d 197, 206 (Utah 1985). Mr.
Nebeker's inability to have parent-time and or custody during the initial part of Graeson's
life and any delay in establishing the parties' child support obligations do not relate to his
ability to care for and provide for the physical custody of his son. They relate instead to
the drawn-out and often frustrating process Mr. Nebeker engaged to gain custody of his
son and to establish paternity. The clear weight of the evidence is that Mr. Nebeker
provided for the physical needs of his son in his home from May 2015 through the time of
trial. Ms. Orton's position would punish an alleged father for allowing due process to take
its course in establishing paternity. It was against the clear weight of the evidence for the
Trial Court to equalize the parties' misconduct when Ms. Orton's drug use, drug
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distribution, and housing instability had taken place during Graeson's life, all of which
affected her ability to care for Graeson, and none of the conduct engaged in by :tvfr. Nebeker
took place during Graeson's lifetime or impacted his ability to care for him. The Trial
Court's weight of the evidence is not harmless because it weighed the evidence equally
against both parties instead of weighing fitness in favor of:tvfr. Nebeker. This harmed Mr.
Nebeker because the Trial Court did not assess his fitness higher relative to Ms. Orton's.
The Trial Court erred in equally assessing the parties' past conduct and moral standards
contrary to Ms. Orton's position that the equalization was appropriate. Brief of Appellee
at p. 16. This Court should have a definite and firm conviction the Trial Court made a
mistake in this respect. Trial courts are required to assess past conduct and moral standards.
Section 30-3-10( 1)(a). The purposes of assessing this and other factors is to compare the
relative2 parenting skills, character, and ability of the parents "in light of a realistic and
objective appraisal of the child's needs" to ascertain the custodial situation that promotes
the child's best interest. Woodwardv. LaFranca, 2013 UT App. 147,122,305 P.3d 181.
The clear weight of the evidence was that any negative past conduct and exhibition of a
poor moral standard by Mr. Nebeker last occurred before Graeson's birth while Ms.
Orton's negative past conduct and exhibition of poor moral standard overlapped much of
Graeson's life. See Hall v. Hall, 326 P.2d 707 (Utah 1958) (finding an alleged polygamist
relationship occurring three years before a modification was too remote). Failing to
account for the temporal proximity would lead to absurd results, particularly in a case like
2 As

discussed it his Appellant Brief, a primary concern of Mr. Nebeker is that the Trial Court committed
plain error by failing to draw distinctions between the parties conduct in assessing best interests factors
and instead assessed different types of conduct as functionally equivalent.
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the present where a trial court would be forced to treat present addictions the same as past
addictions. In this case, where the parties engaged in some similar conduct, e.g., use of
illegal drugs and extramarital relationships, it was legal error to fail to weigh this factor in
favor of Mr. Nebeker based on the proximity of the conduct. See Roberts v. Roberts, 835
P.2d 193, 197 (UT App. 1992) (discussing the necessity of weighing the relative morality
of parties' acts against each other and analyzing the effect of these acts on parenting
ability). In this case, the record is insufficient to sustain the Trial Court's find that the
parties' "past conduct and moral standards [are] equally balanced" if for no other reason
because Ms. Orton's conduct included felony distribution of drugs for which she remained
on probation. ROA at 67. This harmed Mr. Nebeker because the Trial Court did not assess
his past conduct and moral fitness more favorably than it did Ms. Orton's.
It is against the clear weight of the evidence to find any tacit acknowledgment by Mr.
Nebeker that physical custody of Graeson by Ms. Orton is in Graeson's best interests as
argued by Ms. Orton. Appellee's Brief at p. 18. This Court should have a definite and
firm conviction the Trial Court made a mistake in this respect. In this case, the clear weight
of the evidence is that the father was not content with allowing the child to live primarily
with Ms. Orton. He employed three attorneys, participated in the Fifth District case, and
tried to identify Ms. Orton's whereabouts when law enforcement was unable to do so. Even
after obtaining custody of Graeson, Mr. Nebeker was the party to initiate the underlying
case where he sought physical custody - not Ms. Orton. If any party tacitly agreed to a
custody situation, it was Ms. Orton who continued to use drugs, ROA 175 at 46: 19-23, and
took no action to obtain even visitation with Graeson until after Mr. Nebeker initiated the
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case. The fact that Mr. Nebeker litigated the matter, including a two-day trial, should
provide this Court a definite and firm conviction that the Trial Court erred in this respect.
This harmed Mr. Nebeker because the Trial Court used this as a factor in awarding custody
to Ms. Orton.
It is against the clear weight of evidence that Mr. Nebeker wrongfully gained custody

of Graeson and that the evidence is equally balanced as to which parent is more likely to
act in the child's best interests. Appellee's Brief at. P. 17. This Court should have a definite
and firm conviction the Trial Court made a mistake in this respect. Mrs. Orton was not
present when Mr. Nebeker Gained custody of Graeson because "she had problems of her
own." ROA 254 at 122:21-22. No Court had adjudicated custody of Graeson at that time,
though the Fifth District court had orally adjudicated parentage. At the time he obtained
custody of Graeson, Mr. Nebeker stood on equal constitutional grounds with Ms. Orton
and enjoyed the same fundamental constitutional liberty interest as any parent to a child.

See Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P .2d 635, 641 (Utah App. 1995), Jones v. Barlow, 2007
UT 20, 1 39, 154 P.3d 808 ("It is a fundamental tenet of our common law that the only
persons having any actually vested interest in the custody of a child cognizable by the law
are the parents") (internal citations and quotations omitted). Wrongful means "having no
legal claim."

Webster's Online Dictionary, available at https://www.merriam-

webster.com/dictionary/wrongful (accessed April 24, 2018).

Thus, at the time Mr.

Nebeker obtained custody of Graeson, he had a fundamental right to do so, and the only
person with a competing right, Ms. Orton, was absent because she was evading law
enforcement. It is noteworthy that it was Ms. Orton who did not seek relief to remedy the
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situation. The Trial Court's finding places a sibling's right to custody over that of a fit
parent. To find some higher right that inured to the benefit of Ms. Orton which allowed
her to keep and conceal Graeson from Mr. Nebeker while she was selling drugs and running
from law enforcement but no similar right allowing Mr. Nebeker to keep his son from a
sister when Ms. Orton is not present would violate his right to equal protection of the law.
The evidence does not likewise support the Trial Court's finding the evidence is equally
balance as to which party would act in the child's best interests. The evidence shows that
Ms. Orton used drugs, sold drugs, placed and was not stable while caring for her son, while

Mr. Nebeker did none of these things and looked to the courts to remedy the custody
situation. Any characterization of his act of removing his son from Ms. Orton during this
time as wrongful and equalizing the parties' ability to act in the best interests of the child
is harmful because the Trial Court found this did not weigh these factors in his favor. ROA
at 67.
It was against the clear weight of the evidence for the Trial Court to not consider Mr.
Nebeker's care of the child from May 2015 until trial concluded in December 2018 in
assessing the primary caretaker factor. In both Merriam v. Merriam, 799 P.2d 1172, 117778 (Ut. App. 1990) and Paryzek v. Paryzek, 776 P.2d 78, 83 (Ut. App. 1989), this Court
identified the primary caretaker based on proximity to trial. This is not a case where a
party wrongfully seized a child on the eve of a temporary order as suggested by Ms. Orton.
This is a case where a parent exercised his constitutional rights and rescued his child, kept
him exclusively in his custody for seven months, and after that had approximately twothirds of the physical custody based on an agreement with the other parent. ROA 257 at
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167 23-25. The Trial Court equated caring for a child from house-to-house while on the
run with the uncontested stability Mr. Nebeker provided. Giving greater weight to the
primary caretaker leading up to trial is a prudential guideline designed to not uproot a child
from a situation where he is thriving, happy, and well-adjusted. The Trial Court's finding
harmed Mr. Nebeker because it relied on this factor in awarding physical custody to Ms.
Orton.
11.

The Trial Court's Unsupported Findings Remove Any Reasonable Basis for Its
Decision
The Trial Court, based on its erroneous findings of fact, abused its discretion in

awarding sole physical custody of the child to Ms. Orton and minimum parent-time to Mr.
Nebeker. Triggering an abuse of discretion requires a determination that the Trial Court's
judgment is flagrantly unjust, Allen v. Allen, 2014 UT App. 27, 1 8, 319 P .3d 770, or that
there is "no reasonable basis for the decision." Tschaggeny v. Milbank Ins. Co., 2007 UT
37, 1 16, 163 P. 3d 615.

In this case, Mr. Nebeker should prevail in showing that the

evidence does not support several of the Trial Court's factual findings. This, in turn, should
compel a determination the ultimate decision is flagrantly unjust and that there is no
reasonable basis for the decision.
Ms. Orton misunderstands Tucker v. Tucker, 910 Pp.2d 1209 (Utah 1996). While

Tucker did distinguish between temporary and permanent custody awards, it did so to
illustrate that the same burden applicable to a post-decree modification does not apply to
the modification of a temporary order. 910 P.2d 1209, 1216 (a party "need not make a
showing of changed circumstances in the usual sense that is required to modify an order of

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

permanent custody. She need only make a showing that an award of custody to her would
best serve the interests of the child"). It further noted, "[t]his is not to say that the
environment in which a child has lived before the final custody hearing should be ignored
in determining initial custody. It certainly should not be ignored." Id. However, in this
case, that is just what the Trial Court did, it ignored the physical custody situation of the
child leading up to the trial, and by doing so, it abused its discretion.
Ms. Orton argues that Graeson's eventual commencement of school and the distance
between the parties prevented the Trial Court from structuring an order to preserve the
stability and continuity of the child's life. Appellee's Brief at p 22. This is not the case.
This is not Hudema v. Carpentar, where the custodial parent "changed the interpersonal
dynamics of her household by remarrying and by moving from Jackson's lifelong Layton
home to a new home in another state." 1999 UT 290,127,989 P.2d 491. The dynamic of

Mr. Nebeker's home was not going to change, and either was his residence - Graeson's
primary home since May 2015. The dynamic that was going to change is that of Ms. Orton
who planned to leave her brother-in-law's home for a new residence. ROA 175 at 51 :2:15.
The Trial Court thus abused its discretion in interrupting a situation where Graeson was
thriving to place him in an unsettled environment without a compelling reason for doing
so. See Elmer v. Elmer, 776 P.2d 599, 604 (Utah 1989) (addressing modification of a
stipulated decree).
The Trial Court was well equipped to either continue the existing custody situation
adopted by the parties or to fashion a similar situation utilizing extra weekends, holidays,
and extended summer parent-time for Ms. Orton. Essentially, the Trial Court's decision
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crune down to its finding that Ms. Orton's work schedule, a schedule where she worked
more days, but fewer hours in a two-week period than Mr. Nebeker served the child's best
interests. The Trial Court abused its discretion in relying on the parties' work schedules
alone to fashion its custody and parent-time decision. See Fullmer v. Fullmer, 761 P .2d
942, 948 (UT App. 1988) (finding it was an abuse of discretion to base a custody award on
the reality that most parties must work).
The Trial Court abused its discretion by not awarding Mr. Nebeker parent-time more
than Section 30-3-35. The Trial ourt's decision, dated December 23, 2016, issued after
Graeson turned three years old. The only distinction in the parent-time under Section 303-35 and 30-3-35.5 is that extended parent-time is broken up into two blocks and can be
taken throughout the year under Section 30-3-35.5.

See Section 30-3-35.5(3)(f)(iv).

Further, the Trial Court's accommodation for Mr. Nebeker's work schedule is not an above
minimum award; it is an incorporation of an advisory guideline. See Section 30-3-33(8).
Contrary to Ms. Orton's position, the trial record and Mr. Nebeker's brief is replete with
references to the Section 30-3-34(2) factors, including the minimal distance, the bond
between Mr. Nebeker and Graeson, and shared interests. The Trial Court's discretion does
not allow it to ignore when a party has met its burden of showing parent-time beyond the
minimum guidelines will serve a child's best interests and instead award minimum parenttime. Instead, once this burden is met, a trial court must undertake the difficult work of
fashioning a parent-time award to serve the child's best interests. There is no reasonable
basis for the Trial Court's decision to award only minimum parent-time when it could have
used holidays, weekends, and extended time to maximize Graeson's time with both parents.
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5. CONCLUSION
For the preceding reasons, Mr. Nebeker asks that the Court find the Trial Court's factual
findings are not supported by the evidence and that it abused its discretion in fashioning
the custody and parent-time award.
Dated this 25 th day of April 2018

__...,<:...J
_
~·
·______
..

ed Peterson
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6. CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I certify that the preceding brief complies with the word limit in Utah R. App. Pro. Rule
24(g) and Rule 21 regarding public and private records.
Dated this 25 th day of April 2018
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7.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on the 25 th day of April 2018, I served a copy of the preceding on
each of the following:
Benjamin A. Kearns
The Schriever Law Firm
Benjamin@schrieverlaw.com.
Utah Court of Appeals
Courtofappeals@utcourts.gov
Dated this 24th day of April 2018
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RYAN E CHRISTIANSEN #9585
Assistant Attorney General
Sean Reyes #7969
Attorney General
Attorneys for State of Utah
33 North 100 West, Suite 350
St George, UT 84 770
Telephone: (435)634-2485
Email: CFSAGORSGG@utah.gov
Fax: (435)656-0402

IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT, IRON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, Office of
Recovery Services,
JUDGMENT OF PATERNITY
Petitioner,
vs.

Civil No. 144500196

SHANE C NEBEKER and
TRISHA ANN ORTON,

Judge Keith C Barnes

Respondents.

This matter came before the Court on December 15, 2014 for Trial, the Honorable
Keith C Barnes, District Cowt Judge, presiding. The Office of Recovery Services was
represented by Ryan E Christiansen, Assistant Attorney General. Trisha Ann Orton
("mother") was not present nor represented by counsel having contacted counsel for the

17, 2015 08:44 AM
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State stating she was unable to attend the Trial. Shane C Nebeker ("alleged father") was
present pro se.
Based on testimony and evidence presented and the Court being advised, now
therefore,
IT IS ORDERED:

Definition: The singular "child" shall include the plural "children" where
appropriate.
I.

Shane C Nebeker ("father") is the father of G. W. Orton, born December

2013 to Trisha Ann Orton ("mother").
2.

The parent( s) without physical custody shall pay the amount of support set

forth in this paragraph. Beginning July 2014, the father's base child support
obligation is $649.00 per month, and the mother's base child support obligation is
$30.00 per month, based upon the father's gross monthly income of $5,084.00 and
the mother's gross monthly income of $662.00. The support obligations continue
through the end of the month the child becomes 18 years of age, or through the
end of the month of the child's normal and expected date of graduation from high
school, whichever occurs later. When physical custody changes, the parent
without physical custody shall pay as required above without the need to modify

17, 2015 08:44 AM

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2 of 8

this order. This automatic change does not apply to situations involving joint or
split custody or periods of court ordered parent-time.
3.

As long as Shane C Nebeker stays current on his child support, the Office

of Recovery Services shall be limited to only collecting an additional $100.00 each
month toward the child support arrears. The $100.00 limit shall be contingent upon
Shane C Nebeker continuing to stay current on his child support obligation, including the
additional $100 per month payment toward the arrears.
4.

Immediate and automatic income withholding shall apply for the payment

of child support.
5.

All child support payments shall be made to the Office of Recovery

Services, P.O. Box 45011, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0011, unless the Office
gives notice that payments should be sent elsewhere.
6.

If insurance for medical and dental expenses is available or becomes

available to either parent at reasonable cost, and is accessible to the child, the
parent(s) shall be responsible for maintaining insurance for their dependent child.
7.

If, at any point in time, the dependent child is covered by the health,

hospital or dental insurance plans of both parents, the health, hospital, or dental
insurance plan of the father shall be primary coverage for the dependent child and
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the health, hospital, or dental insurance plan of the mother shall be secondary
coverage for the dependent child. If a parent remarries and his or her dependent
child is not covered by that parent's health, hospital, or dental insurance plan but is
covered by a step-parent's plan, the health, hospital, or dental insurance plan of the
step-parent shall be treated as if it is the plan of the remarried parent and shall
retain the same designation as the primary or secondary plan of the dependent
child.
8.

Both parents shall provide cash medical support by equally sharing all

reasonable and necessary uninsured and unreimbursed medical and dental
expenses incurred for the dependent child, including deductibles and copayments.
9.

Both parents shall share equally the out-of-pocket costs of the child's

portion of the premium actually paid by the parent who maintains the insurance.
10.

Written verification of insurance enrollment, medical and dental insurance

premiums and any change in coverage or premiums be provided to the Office.
11.

Unless and until verification is provided to the Office, no credit will be

given by the Office.
12.

If child care costs are incurred, the father and mother shall share equally all

reasonable monthly work-related child care costs.
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13.

The father and mother shall notify the Office of any change in residence,

employment, income or custody.
14.

Reimbursement of support, custody, parent-time, the child's name, tax

exemption and any other issues related to the rights of the parents are reserved for
separate determination upon application to the Court by either parent.

--------------------------END OF ORDER------------------------THE COURT'S SIGNATURE APPEARS AT THE TOP OF THE FIRST PAGE
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NOTICE TO PARTIES
TO THE PARTIES ABOVE-NAMED:
Pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 7(f)(2), this proposed Order will be filed with the Court
seven days after service upon you. Your objections, if any, must be filed with the Court
within seven days after service.

*****

Any party may request an adjustment of this child support order under subsections (8)
and (9) of Utah Code Ann. Section 78B-12-210 ifthere occurs a non-temporary,
substantial change in circumstances OR if after three years there is a non-temporary
difference of at least 10% between the amount ordered and the amount that would be
required under the guidelines.
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that on the 3rd day of June, 2015, a copy of the Judgment of Paternity was
e-filed, e-mailed, or mailed postage prepaid, to:
Shane C Nebeker
1035 E 1200 N
Central Valley, UT 84754-3162

Isl Zara McMullin

Zara F Mcmullin
Secretary
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that on the 3rd day of June, 2015, a copy of the Judgment of Paternity was
e-filed, e-mailed, or mailed postage prepaid, to:
Trisha Ann Orton
Po Box 1546
Parowan, UT 84 761-1546

/s/ Zara McMullin
Zara F Mcmullin
Secretary
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